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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff and Respondant, 
vs. Case No. 
RODNEY C . ROSE 12974 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Appellant, Rodney C. Rose, appeals 
from his conviction of SALE OF A STIMULANT 
DRUG, to-wit: Methamphetamine, in violation 
of § 58-33-6 (1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
upon a trial to the court sitting without a 
jury, in the Second Judicial District Court 
of Weber County, State of Utah. The Honor-
able John F. Wahlquist presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN LONER COURT 
The appellant was charged by Complaint 
(1) 
on the 7th day of May, 1971, with the crime 
of sale of a Stimulant Drug, to-wit: Metham-
phetamines. Preliminay hearing was held on 
the 8th day of October, 1971, and the court 
after amending the complaint to conform to 
the evidence, bound the defendant over to 
stand trial in the District Court. The ap-
pellant was charged by information in the 
District Court with the crime of sale of a 
stimulant drug, and trial was held before 
the court without a jury on the 13th day of 
April, 1972. The court found the appellant 
guilty as charged and sentenced to serve a 
term in the Utah State Prison for not less 
than one nor more than ten years. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant respectfully requests 
~is Honorable Court to reverse the judg-
ment of the Lower Court and remand the 




STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant was charged by Complaint 
on the 7th of May, 1971, with the offense 
of sell of a stimulant drug, to-wit: Meth-
amphetamine. (Tr-1} Preliminary hearing 
was held on October 8, 1971, and following 
the testimony of the State's witnesses the 
attorney for the State made a Motion To 
Amend the Complaint to read "amphetamine" 
instead of "methamphetamine." (Tr-11) 
Counsel for the defendant objected to the 
amendment but the Court overruled the ob-
jection and ordered the Complaint amended 
and the defendant bound over to District 
Court to stand trial. (Tr-2) 
For some reason unknown to this writer 
the District Attorney filed his information 
alleging the sell of metharnphetamine as 
opposed to amphetamine. (Tr-14) The de-
fendant entered a plea of "NOT GUILTY" to 
the information charging him with sell of 
( 3) 
---
a stimulant drug, to-wit: methampheta-
mine. Trial was held before the Honorable 
John F. Wahlquist without a jury on the 
13th day of April, 1972. At the conclusion 
of the case the Judge pronounced his ver-
diet as follows: "The Court finds the 
defendant guilty as charged." (Tr-182) 
POINT I 
THE STATE FAILED TO CHARGE OR PROVE THAT 
THE ACTS ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN COMMITED BY 
THE APPELLANT WERE IN VIOLATION OF UTAH 
LAl'fS. 
The appellant was charged under the 
"Drug Abuse Control Law" Title 58-33-6 (1), 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, with the sell of 
a stimulant drug, to-wit: methamphetamine. 
After reviewing the "Drug Abuse Control 
Law" this writer was unable to find any 
section of that law that defined metham-
phetamine as being a depressant, stimulant 
or hallucinogenic drug, nor was I able to 
locate any portion of that law that prohibited 
the sell of methamphetamine. 
(4) 
under §58-33-1 (d) (2), Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, (Definitions) the Code 
does define dl-methamphetamine as being 
a depressant, stimulant or hallucinogenic 
drug, however, there was no evidence before 
the Court that "dl-methamphetamine" and 
"methamphetamine" are the same substance. 
In a criminal prosecution the State 
has the burden of proving all elements of 
the alleged offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt. §77-31-4 Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
In this case the State accused the appel-
lant of an act which it contends is il-
legal. The only way the State could meet 
its burden of proof would be to show by 
competent evidence that methamphetamine 
and dl-methamphetamine are the same sub-
stance. 
One of the witnesses called by the 
State was Stanley Merrett, a Utah State 
Toxologist (Tr-133). If anyone could have 
clarified this question, Mr. Merrett could, 
( 5) 
but the State in no way attempted to meet 
its burden of proof on one of the more 
critical elements of a violation of law. 
By analogy, if a person were to be 
charged with the offense of sell of a stim-
ulant drug, to-wit: methodism; it might 
be assumed that methodism is some form of 
a drug that generally goes by a different 
name, and at trial the State might be able 
to prove the two to be the same. However, 
at trial if the State merely proves that 
methodism may be stimulating, but cannot 
prove it is a drug, then the State has 
failed to meet its burden. 
The net result is that the appellant 
now stands convicted of an offense which 
the Legislature has not defined as a crime, 
and this Court has a duty to rectify the 
situation. 
POINT II 
TEE COURT ERRED BY CONVICTING THE APPELLANT 
WHEN THE EVIDENCE DID NOT SUPPORT THE STATE'S 
(6) 
ALLEGATIONS. 
The appellant was charged by inform-
ation with the crime of Sell of a Stimu-
lant Drug, to-wit: Methamphetamine. The 
only evidence presented at trial as to the 
nature of the substance in question was 
that testimony given by Stanley Marrett, 
a Toxologist. (Tr-133 to 139) Through Mr. 
Morrett's testimony it is very clear that 
the substance in question was NOT metham-
phetamine. Mr. Merrett ran two tests on 
the substance (1) ultra violet spectrophoto-
metry and (2) gas chromatography. (Tr-135) 
He testified that the gas chromatography 
test which he ran distinguishes ampheta-
mine from methamphetamine, and that the 
substance he tested was amphetamine and 
not methamphetamine. (Tr-136) 
We contend that the subject matter 
or object of the act is crux the of the 
charge and must be proven. If it is not, 
(7) 
prior decisions of that Court they did 
acknowledge the rule of law we are con-
cerned with, as follows: 
"This Court has held that if 
a person is found guilty of an 
offense that is not charged in 
the indictment, the verdict is 
contrary to law. McGuire v. State 
(1875) 50 Ind. 284; Thelge v. 
State (1882) 83 Ind. 126.", at 
page 650. 
In State v. Jordan, 37 S.E. 2d 111, 
(N.E. 1946), the appellant had been charged 
with the offense of Burglary in the 1st 
Degree, but he was actually tried on Burg-
lary in the 2nd Degree, and found guilty 
of Burglary in the 1st Degree. In revers-
ing the held as follows; at page 112: 
" ... but it would seem to be 
without precedent to try a de-
fendant for one offense and to 
convict him of another and great-
er offense, even though the con-
viction be of a higher degree 
of the same offense for which 
he is being tried." 
Inasmuch as I was appointed on Appeal, 
after trial, I do not have benefit of trial 
counsel's thinking on this point. But it 
( 9) 
appears that there may have been a mis-
take in charging the offense. If that 
is the case, it would seem that §77-31-
19, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, should 
require that the case be remanded for 
re-charging, and a new trial. I acknow-
ledge that §77-31-19 deals with those 
cases where the mistake is discovered 
before verdict or judgment, but the same 
logic should follow after verdict and 
judgment. 
In any event this appellant stands 
convicted of the crime of Sell of Meth-
amphetamine and the State's evidence con-
clusively proves there was never any meth-
amphetamines involved in this incident. 
CONCLUSION 
If the problems presented on this 
appeal seem to have been the result of 
mistake, confusion, or misunderstandings, 
they may be partially explained by the 
fact that the appellant had one attorney 
(10) 
at preliminary hearing, another at trial, 
and a third attorney appointed for the 
purpose of appeal. The State was repre-
sented by the County Attorney's office 
through preliminary hearing, and the Dis-
trict Attorney's office handled the trial. 
Whatever the cause may be, the judicial 
process broke down in this case and the 
appellant was improperly convicted. 
We respectfully request this Court 
to remand this case back to the District 
Court for a new trial. 
Respectfully Submitted. 
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H. DON SHARP 
Attorney at Law 
#9 Bank of Utah Plaza 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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